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Abstract: The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly
divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents
have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform allocation rule is the
unique strategy-proof, e¢ cient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set
of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there
exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency,
and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a
slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawas (1998) result.
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1. Introduction
The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible
good among a group of n agents. A rule maps preference proles into n shares
of the amount M . Sprumont (1991) shows that, given M , if agents have single-
peaked preferences over their shares, the uniformallocation rule is the unique
strategy-proof, e¢ cient, and anonymous rule. This is a nice example of a large
literature that, by restricting the domain of preferences, investigates the possibility
of designing strategy-proof rules.1 Moreover, in this case, single-peakedness does
not only allow strategy-proof rules but also e¢ cient ones.
In this paper we ask how much the set of single-peaked preferences can be
enlarged to still allow for rules satisfying interesting properties. In particular,
we show that there is a unique maximal domain of preferences that includes the
set of single-peaked preferences for which there exists at least one rule satisfying
strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency, and strong symmetry. Moreover, we characterize it
as the set of feebly single-plateaued preferences.
It turns out that this maximal domain depends crucially on both M and n.
Indeed the egalitarian shareM=n plays, as a consequence of the strong symmetry
requirement, a fundamental role in its description. In particular, our domain
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includes only preferences whose set of best shares is an interval and which are
weakly monotonic on an interval  dened by the relative position ofM=n and the
set of best shares. Our set departs from the single-peaked domain in two signicant
directions. First, shares outside  can be ordered freely. Second, special intervals
of indi¤erence are allowed on . The set of these preferences, given M and
n, is much larger than the single-plateaued domain studied by Moulin (1984)
and Berga (1998) in a public good context, since single-plateaued preferences are
strictly monotonic on both sides of the plateau. We do not claim that the domain
identied here has economic relevance; rather, we understand our result as giving
a precise and denite answer to an interesting and economically relevant question.
Furthermore, the intersection of all of our maximal domains, when M varies
from 0 to 1, coincides with the single-plateaued domain. This also implies that,
when the rule depends not only on preferences but also on the amount M to be
allocated, the maximal domain coincides with the set of single-plateaued prefer-
ences as already shown by Ching and Serizawa (1998). Notice that in their setting,
M is treated as a variable of the problem rather than one of its data. We want to
emphasize though, that in spite of their result, our analysis with a xed amount
M is meaningful since there are many allocation problems where to assume the
contrary would be senseless.
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A number of papers have also identied maximal domains of preferences al-
lowing for strategy-proof social choice functions in voting environments. Barberà,
Sonneschein, and Zhou (1991) show that the set of separable preferences is the
maximal domain that preserves strategy-proofness of voting by committees with-
out dummies and vetoers. Serizawa (1995), Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1999),
Berga and Serizawa (2000), and Berga (1997) improve upon this result in several
directions; for instance, by either looking at a more general voting model and/or
by admitting larger classes of social choice functions.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in contrast to all the papers mentioned
above, the rule that we exhibit when showing our maximality result is not tops-
onlyin the sense that it does not depend exclusively on the n sets of best shares.
E¢ ciency forces the rule to be sensitive to intervals of indi¤erence away from the
top.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains notation, denitions, and
the statement of our result. This is proven in Section 3. Section 4 concludes by
deriving a weaker version of Ching and Serizawas (1998) result as a corollary of
our theorem and by relating our maximal domains to the optionsets associated
with strategy-proof, e¢ cient, and strongly symmetric rules.
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2. Preliminaries, Denitions, and the Theorem
Agents are indexed by the elements of a nite set N = f1; ::; ng where n  2.
They have to share the amount M 2 IR++ of a perfectly divisible good. An
allocation is a vector (x1; :::; xn) 2 IRn+ such that
P
xi =M . We denote by Z the
set of allocations. Each agent i 2 N has a complete preorder Ri over [0;M ], his
preference relation. Let Pi be the strict preference relation associated with Ri and
let Ii be the corresponding indi¤erence relation. We assume that preferences are
continuous in the sense that for each x 2 [0;M ] the sets fy 2 [0;M ] j xRiyg and
fy 2 [0;M ] j yRixg are closed. We denote by R the set of continuous preferences
on [0;M ] and by V a generic subset of R. Preference proles are n-tuples of
continuous preferences on [0;M ] and they are denoted by R = (R1; :::; Rn) 2
Rn. When we want to stress the role of agent is preference we will represent a
preference prole by (Ri; R i).
A rule on Vn  Rn is a function  : Vn  ! Z; that is, Pi(R) = M for all
R 2 Vn:
Rules require each agent to report a preference. A rule is strategy-proof if
it is always in the best interest of an agent to reveal his preferences truthfully.
Formally,
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Denition 1. A rule on Vn, , is strategy-proof if for all (R1; :::; Rn) 2 Vn, all
i 2 N , and all R0i 2 V we have i (Ri; R i)Rii (R0i; R i).
Given a preference prole R 2 Vn, an allocation x 2 Z is e¢ cient if there is
no z 2 Z such that for all i 2 N , ziRixi, and for at least one j 2 N we have
zjPjxj. Denote by E (R) the set of e¢ cient allocations.
A rule is e¢ cient if it selects an e¢ cient allocation. Formally,
Denition 2. A rule on Vn, , is e¢ cient if for all R 2 Vn, we have  (R) 2
E (R).
We are also interested in rules satisfying the following property.
Denition 3. A rule on Vn, , is strongly symmetric if for all R 2 Vn and all
i,j 2 N such that Ri = Rj, we have i (R) = j (R).2
We will consider di¤erent subsets of preferences, all of them related to single-
peakedness. For the denitions we need the following notation. Given a prefer-
ence Ri 2 R we denote the set of preferred shares according to Ri as p (Ri) =
fx 2 [0;M ] j xRiy for all y 2 [0;M ]g. Let p(Ri) = min p(Ri) and p(Ri) = max p(Ri).
Abusing notation, we also denote by p (Ri) the unique element of the set p (Ri)
whenever p(Ri) = p(Ri).
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The rst denition is the classical notion of single-peakedness. It requires that
the preference Ri has a unique maximal element p (Ri) and on each side preference
is monotonic and strict. Formally,
Denition 4. A preference Ri 2 R is single-peaked if p (Ri) is a singleton and
for all x; y 2 [0;M ] we have xPiy whenever y < x < p (Ri) or p (Ri) < x < y.
Let Rs be the set of single-peaked preferences on [0;M ]. The following rule
on Rs, the uniform allocation rule, has been extensively studied.
Denition 5. The uniform allocation rule on Rns , U , is dened as follows: for all
R 2 Rns and all i 2 N ,
Ui (R) =
8>><>>:
min fp (Ri) ;  (R)g if M 
P
p(Rj),
max fp (Ri) ;  (R)g if M 
P
p(Rj),
where  (R) solves
P
Uj (R) =M .
Ching (1994) characterized the uniform allocation rule on Rns as the unique
one satisfying strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency, and symmetry.3
The second denition of preferences is a bit weaker since it allows for indi¤er-
ences at the top.
8
Denition 6. A preference Ri 2 R is single-plateaued if p (Ri) =

p(Ri); p(Ri)

and for all x; y 2 [0;M ] we have xPiy whenever y < x < p(Ri) or p(Ri) < x < y.4
Let Rsp be the set of single-plateaued preferences. The following rule on Rnsp
constitutes a natural extension of the uniform allocation rule to the domain of
single-plateaued preferences.
Denition 7. The uniform allocation rule on Rnsp,  , is dened as follows: for
all R 2 Rnsp and all i 2 N ,
 i (R) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
min

p (Ri) ;  (R)
	
if M Pj p (Rj),
min

p (Ri) ; p (Ri) +  (R)
	
if
P
j p (Rj) M 
P
j p (Rj),
max fp (Ri) ;  (R)g if
P
j p (Rj) M ,
where (R) solves
P
 j(R) =M:
Finally, our third denition of preferences, the weakest one, refers to the fol-
lowing interval (Ri), which will play a fundamental role in the sequel:
(Ri) =

min

M
n
; p(Ri)

;max

M
n
; p(Ri)

.
Before stating the formal denition, it seems useful to give a verbal explanation
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of the set of feebly single-plateaued preferences. A preference relation Ri 2 R
is feebly single-plateaued if its set of best shares is an interval and the following
additional properties are satised.
(a) If (Ri) =

M
n
; p(Ri)

, then the preference has to be increasing between
M=n and its smallest best share p(Ri), although it may have intervals of indif-
ference provided these intervals are su¢ ciently large in relation to M . Moreover,
the egalitarian share M=n has to be at least as good as all smaller shares, but all
orderings are possible among them.
(b) If (Ri) =

p(Ri);
M
n

, then the preference has to be decreasingbetween its
largest best share p(Ri) and M=n, although it may have intervals of indi¤erence
provided these intervals are su¢ ciently small in relation to M .5 Moreover, the
egalitarian share M=n has to be at least as good as all larger shares, but also all
orderings are possible among them.
Finally, if (Ri) =

p(Ri); p(Ri)

, then, no additional requirement is imposed.
Formally,
Denition 8. A preference Ri 2 R is feebly single-plateaued if for all x; y 2
[0;M ]:
(a) If [x < y and M=n  y  p(Ri)] then [yRix and if yIix then there exists
[x0; y0]  [x; y] such that x0 + y0 > M and x0Iiy0 for all x0 2 [x0; y0]].
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(b) If [x < y and p(Ri)  x  M=n] then [xRiy and if xIiy then there exists
[x0; y0]  [x; y] such that x0 + y0 < M and x0Iiy0 for all x0 2 [x0; y0]].
(c) If x 2 p(Ri); p(Ri) then xIip(Ri).
We denote by Rfsp the set of feebly single-plateaued preferences. Notice that
this preference restriction implies a weak-monotonicitycondition on the corre-
sponding intervals () and that the number of agents n also appears in conditions
(a) and (b). Theorem 1 states that the domain of feebly single-plateaued pref-
erences is the unique maximal domain admitting strategy-proof, e¢ cient, and
strongly symmetric rules. Figure 1 illustrates three possible types of feebly single-
plateaued preferences depending on whether M=n  p (Ri), p (Ri)  M=n, or
p (Ri) M=n  p (Ri).
Insert Figure 1 here
Following Ching and Serizawa (1998) we can dene, given a list of properties
that a rule may satisfy, the concept of a maximal domain of preferences for this
list.
Denition 9. A setRm of preferences is amaximal domain for a list of properties
if: (1) Rm  R; (2) there exists a rule on Rnm satisfying the properties; and (3)
there is no rule on Qn satisfying the same properties such that Rm ( Q  R:
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Theorem 1. The set of feebly single-plateaued preferences, Rfsp, is the unique
maximal domain including Rs for the properties of strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency,
and strong symmetry.
Before proving Theorem 1 we illustrate, in Example 1 below, the reason why
e¢ ciency and strong symmetry together force the domain to contain only pref-
erences with intervals of indi¤erence of a very special type away from the set of
best shares.
Example 1. Let M = 8 and N = f1; 2g. Let  be any e¢ cient and strongly
symmetric rule. Consider the preference R on [0; 8] dened by:
y Px for all 0  x < y  2 and all 5  x < y  8,
y Ix for all x; y 2 [2; 5].
Note that condition (a) of Denition 8 is not satised because 2I5 and there is
no an interval of indi¤erence [x0; y0]  [2; 5] such that x0 + y0 > 8. Therefore
R =2 Rfsp. A maximal domain of preferences cannot contain R because by strong
symmetry 
 
R; R

= (4; 4) but the existence of the allocation (2; 6), which is
such that 2I4 and 6 P4, indicates that 
 
R; R

=2 E   R; R, contradicting the
e¢ ciency of . Consider now the preference R^ on [0; 8] dened by:
yP^x for all 0  x < y  3 and all 6  x < y  8,
yI^x for all x; y 2 [3; 6].
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Note that condition (a) of Denition 8 is satised because the sum of the extremes
of the indi¤erence interval [3; 6] is larger than 8. Therefore R^ 2 Rfsp. In contrast,
the allocation 

R^; R^

= (4; 4) belongs to E

R^; R^

.
To illustrate the role of condition (b) in Denition 8 consider the preference ~R
on [0; 8] dened by:
x ~Py for all 0  x < y  3 and all 6  x < y  8,
x~Iy for all x; y 2 [3; 6].
In this case ~R =2 Rfsp because now the sum of the extremes of the indi¤erence
interval is larger than 8. By strong symmetry 

~R; ~R

= (4; 4) but 2 ~P4 and
6~I4 which indicates that 

~R; ~R

=2 E

~R; ~R

, contradicting the e¢ ciency of .
Finally, consider the preference R0 on [0; 8] dened by:
xP 0y for all 0  x < y  2 and all 5  x < y  8,
xI 0y for all x; y 2 [2; 5].
Now condition (b) of Denition 8 is satised because the sum of the extremes of
the indi¤erence interval [2; 5] is smaller than 8. Therefore R0 2 Rfsp. In this case
the allocation  (R0; R0) = (4; 4) belongs to E (R0; R0).
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3. The Proof of Theorem 1
Before proving Theorem 1 we state, in the following remark, a consequence of
Chings characterization (Ching, 1994) that we will repeatedly use in this section.
Remark 1. Let  be any rule on Vn ( Rns ) satisfying strategy-proofness, e¢ -
ciency, and strong symmetry. If R 2Rns then  (R) = U (R); that is,  coincides
with the uniform allocation rule on the subset of single-peaked preferences.
Let Rm be a subset of preferences satisfying the following condition: Rs (
Rm  R. Suppose that there exists a rule onRnm, , satisfying strategy-proofness,
e¢ ciency, and strong symmetry. Assume Rm is a maximal domain in R satisfy-
ing these properties. To show that Rm = Rfsp we will use the following Lem-
mata, where R0; RM 2 Rs will denote the two single-peaked preferences such that
p (R0) = 0 and p
 
RM

=M .
Lemma 1. Let R0 2 Rm and x; y 2 [0;M ] be arbitrary.
Case 1: M=n  x < y  p (R0). Then yR0x.
Case 2: p (R0)  y < x M=n. Then yR0x.
Proof of Lemma 1. Case 1: Suppose otherwise; that is, there exist R0 2 Rm
and x,y 2 [0;M ] such that M=n  x < y  p (R0) and xP0y. We can also nd
(see Figure 2) x0,y0 2 [0;M ] such that:
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(a.1) M=n  x0 < y0  p (R0) ,
(a.2) x0I0y0,
(a.3) x0R0x for all x 2 [M=n; x0] , and
(a.4) x0P0x for all x 2 (x0; y0) .
Insert Figure 2 here
Notice that x0 is the smallest value below p (R0) and above M=n at which R0
starts decreasing to its right.6 Since R0 is continuous and p (R0)R0x, the existence
of such y0 follows. Obviously, x0 could be equal to M=n, y0 equal to p (R0), or
both.
Note that for all z0 2 (x0; y0) the following inequalities hold:
M   y0
n  1 <
M   z0
n  1 <
M   x0
n  1 
M
n
. (3.1)
Now, x z0 2 (x0; y0) and let R 2 Rs be such that p
 
R

= M z0
n 1 and 
M y0
n 1

P
 
M x0
n 1

: The existence of such a preference R follows from (3.1).
Let R^ 2 Rs be any preference such that p

R^

= x0: By Remark 1, 

R^; R; :::; R

=
U

R^; R; :::; R

, and since
x0 + (n  1)  M   z0
n  1 < M ,
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we have that 1

R^; R; :::; R

= x0: By strategy-proofness of ,
1
 
R0; R; :::; R

R0x0: (3.2)
Again, by Remark 1, 1
 
RM ; R; ::; R

= z0 and by strategy-proofness of ,
z0R
M1
 
R0; R; :::; R

, implying that
1
 
R0; R; :::; R
  z0: (3.3)
Finally, by Remark 1, 1
 
R0; R; :::; R

= M=n and by strategy-proofness of
, M=nR01
 
R0; R; :::; R

, implying that
1
 
R0; R; :::; R
  M
n
: (3.4)
Then, by (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4),

 
R0; R; :::; R

=

x1;
M   x1
n  1 ; :::;
M   x1
n  1

(3.5)
withM=n  x1  x0 and x1I0x0: But the existence of the allocation
 
y0;
M y0
n 1 ; :::;
M y0
n 1

and (3.5) imply that 
 
R0; R; :::; R

=2 E  R0; R; :::; R, contradicting the e¢ -
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ciency of .
Case 2: Its proof is omitted since it follows an argument which is symmetric
to the one used to prove Case 1. 
Lemma 2. Let R0 2 Rm and x 2 [0;M ] be arbitrary.
Case 1: x < M=n  p (R0). Then M=nR0x.
Case 2: p (R0) M=n < x. Then M=nR0x.
Proof of Lemma 2. Case 1: Suppose otherwise; that is, there exist R0 2 Rm
and x0 < M=n  p (R0) such that x0P0M=n:
First, assume thatM=n is a minimal element on [x0;M=n] relative to R0; that
is
yR0
M
n
for all y 2

x0;
M
n

. (3.6)
Since  is strongly symmetric,
 (R0; :::; R0) = (M=n; :::;M=n) : (3.7)
By (3.6) and Lemma 1 we have that for all " 2  0;minM
n
  x0; p (R0)  Mn
	
;

M
n
  "

R0
M
n
and

M
n
+ "

R0
M
n
.
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Let " = min

M
n
  x0; p (R0)  Mn
	
. Then, either

M
n
  "

P0
M
n
or

M
n
+ "

P0
M
n
,
depending on whether " is either equal to M
n
  x0 or to p (R0)   Mn , respec-
tively. Then the allocation
  
M
n
+ "

;
 
M
n
  " ;M=n; :::;M=n and (3.7) imply
that  (R0; :::; R0) =2 E (R0; :::; R0), contradicting the e¢ ciency of .
Second, assume that there exists y0 2 (x0;M=n) such that M=nP0y0: Then,
there exist x1, y1 and z1 such that:
(a.1) 0  x1 < z1 < y1 M=n,
(a.2) x1I0y1I0M=n,
(a.3) x1P0x for all x 2 (x1; y1) , and
(a.4) y1I0x for all x 2 [y1;M=n] .
Note that
M
n
 M   y1
n  1 <
M   z1
n  1 <
M   x1
n  1 .
Now, let R 2 Rs be any single-peaked preference such that p
 
R

= M z1
n 1 and
M x1
n 1
P M y1
n 1 : By Remark 1, 1
 
RM ; R; :::; R

= U1
 
RM ; R; :::; R

= M=n, the
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uniform allocation: By strategy-proofness of ,
1
 
R0; R; :::; R

R0
M
n
: (3.8)
Again, by Remark 1, 1
 
R0; R; :::; R

= z1 and by strategy-proofness of ,
z1R
01
 
R0; R; :::; R

, implying that
1
 
R0; R; :::; R
  z1: (3.9)
Then, by (3.8) and (3.9),
1
 
R0; R; :::; R
  y1: (3.10)
Finally, by Remark 1, 1
 
RM ; R; :::; R

= M=n and by strategy-proofness of
; M=nRM1
 
R0; R; :::; R

; implying that
1
 
R0; R; :::; R
  M
n
: (3.11)
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Then by (3.10) and (3.11),

 
R0; R; :::; R

=

x2;
M   x2
n  1 ; :::;
M   x2
n  1

(3.12)
with y1  x2  M=n and x2I0M=n (by construction). But then, since M x2n 1 
M y1
n 1 ,
R 2 Rs, and all preference orderings are transitive, the allocation
 
x1;
M x1
n 1 ; :::;
M x1
n 1

and (3.12) imply that 
 
R0; R; :::; R

=2 E  R0; R; :::; R contradicting the e¢ -
ciency of .
Case 2: Its proof is omitted since it follows an argument which is symmetric
to the one used to prove Case 1. 
Lemma 3. Let R0 2 Rm and x 2 [0;M ] be arbitrary.
Case 1: x < M=n  p (R0) and xI0M=n: Then M=nI0x0 for all x0 2 [x;M=n].
Case 2: p (R0) M=n < x and xI0M=n: Then M=nI0x0 for all x0 2 [M=n; x].
Proof of Lemma 3. Case 1: Suppose otherwise; that is, there exist R0 2 Rm
and x1 < M=n  p (R0) such that x1I0M=n and M=nP0z1 for at least one z1 2
(x1;M=n). Notice that by Lemma 2 we already know that M=nR0z1. Without
loss of generality we can assume that there exists y1 2 [x1;M=n] such thatM=nI0y
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for all y 2 [y1;M=n], M=nP0y for all y 2 (x1; y1), and z1 2 (x1; y1). Note that
M
n
 M   y1
n  1 <
M   z1
n  1 <
M   x1
n  1 .
Now, let R 2 Rs be any single-peaked preference such that p
 
R

= M z1
n 1 and
M x1
n 1
P M y1
n 1 :
By Remark 1, 
 
RM ; R; :::; R

= U
 
RM ; R; :::; R

; therefore, 1
 
RM ; R; :::; R

=
M=n: By strategy-proofness of ,
1
 
R0; R; :::; R

R0
M
n
: (3.13)
Again, by Remark 1, 1
 
R0; R; :::; R

= z1 and by strategy-proofness of ;
z1R
01
 
R0; R; :::; R

; implying that
1
 
R0; R; :::; R
  z1: (3.14)
Then, by (3:13) and (3:14) ;
1
 
R0; R; :::; R
  y1: (3.15)
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Finally, since 1
 
RM ; R; :::; R

=M=n, by strategy-proofness of ;
M=nRM1
 
R0; R; :::; R

; implying that
1
 
R0; R; :::; R
  M
n
: (3.16)
Then by (3:15) and (3:16),

 
R0; R; :::; R

=

x2;
M   x2
n  1 ; :::;
M   x2
n  1

(3.17)
with y1  x2  M=n and M x2n 1  M y1n 1 : Because M x1n 1 P M y1n 1 P M x2n 1 and x1I0x2
we have that the allocation
 
x1;
M x1
n 1 ; :::;
M x1
n 1

and (3.17) imply that
 
R0; R; :::; R

=2
E
 
R0; R; :::; R

, contradicting the e¢ ciency of .
Case 2: Its proof is omitted since it follows an argument which is symmetric
to the one used to prove Case 1. 
Lemma 4. Let R0 2 Rm and x; y 2 [0;M ] be arbitrary.
Case 1: M=n  x < y  p (R0) and xI0y: Then there exists an interval [x0; y0] 
[x; y] such that x0 + y0 > M and x0I0y0 for all x0 2 [x0; y0].
Case 2: p (R0)  x < y  M=n and xI0y: Then there exists an interval [x0; y0] 
[x; y] such that x0 + y0 < M and x0I0y0 for all x0 2 [x0; y0].
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To prove Lemma 4 we need the following denition.
Denition 10. Given a preference R0 2 R we say that the interval [x0; y0] is
a maximal interval of indi¤erence for R0 if x0I0x0 for all x0 2 [x0; y0] and if
[x1; y1]  [x0; y0] is such that xI0x0 for all x 2 [x1; y1], then [x0; y0] = [x1; y1].
Proof of Lemma 4. Case 1: Let R0 2 Rm and suppose that x and y are such
that M=n  x < y  p (R0) and xI0y: By Lemmata 1, 2, and 3 there exists
a maximal interval of indi¤erence for R0, [x0; y0], containing [x; y]. Notice that
x0I0y0 for all x0 2 [x0; y0] and M=n < y0.
In order to obtain a contradiction, assume that x0+ y0 M . Let z0 2 (x0; y0)
be any share such that M=n  z0 and
(z0   x0) > (y0   z0).
Subcase 1.1: n  3 and there exists an integer n0 such that n  n0  3 and
(n0   1) z0 M  n0z0.
Notice that the latter condition is only possible if x0 + y0 M .
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Let R 2 Rs be such that
p( R) =M   (n0   1)z0 = z1 and M
n0
Py1 =M   (n0   1) y0.
Notice that M=n0  z0 implies z1 =M   (n0   1)z0 M=n0. Therefore,
y1 =M   (n0   1) y0 < M   (n0   1)z0 = z1  M
n0
.
Dene R0 = ( R0; :::; R0| {z }
(n0 1) times
; R0; :::; R0; R) 2 Rnm. In order to show that
 (R0) = ( z0; :::; z0| {z }
(n0 1) times
; 0; :::; 0; z1) suppose rst that
 (R0) = (t1; :::; t1; t2; :::; t2; t3) (3.18)
with t2 > 0: Since

 
R0; :::; R0; R
0; :::; R0; R0

= (M=n0; :::;M=n0; 0; :::; 0;M=n0) (3.19)
we have that n (R0) = t3 RM=n0, which implies
M   (n0   1) y0 < t3  M
n0
. (3.20)
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But the existence of the allocation
 
t
0
1; :::; t
0
1; 0; :::; 0; t3

and (3.18) imply that
 (R0) =2 E (R0). To see this, rst notice that 0P 0t2. Moreover, condition (3:20)
implies M=n0  t01  y0. Therefore, since t1 < t01  y0; Lemmata 1 and 2 imply
that t
0
1R0t1, contradicting the e¢ ciency of .
Now assume that
 (R0) =
 
t^1; :::; t^1; 0; :::; 0; t^3

(3.21)
and t^3 6= z1 =M   (n0   1) z0. Since (3:19), n (R0) = t^3 RM=n0, which implies
M   (n0   1) y0 < t^3  M
n0
. (3.22)
But the existence of the allocation (z0; :::; z0; 0; :::; 0; z1) and (3.21) imply that
 (R0) =2 E (R0). To see this, rst notice that z1 P t^3 since p
 
R

= z1 and z1 6= t^3.
Moreover, (3:22) implies M=n0  t^1  y0. Therefore, since t^1  y0, we have that
z0I0y0R0t^1. Hence, z0R0t^1, contradicting the e¢ ciency of . Therefore,
 (R0) = ( z0; :::; z0| {z }
(n0 1) times
; 0; :::; 0; z1): (3.23)
To nish with Subcase 1.1, suppose rst that y0 < M . Let " > 0 be such
that (z0   x0) > " > (y0   z0). Because (z0   ") 2 [x0; z0], (z0 + ") > y0, and by
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Lemma 1, we have that (z0   ") I0z0 and (z0 + ")P0z0, since [x0; y0] is a maximal
interval of indi¤erence for R0. Therefore, the existence of the allocation
((z0   ") ; (z0 + ") ; z0; :::; z0| {z }
(n0 3) times
; 0; :::; 0; z1)
and (3.23) imply that  (R0) =2 E (R0), contradicting the e¢ ciency of . Now,
assume that the extreme case y0 = M holds. Then, x0 = 0 because our contra-
diction hypothesis says that x0 + y0  M . In this case R0 is such that xI0y for
all x; y 2 [0;M ]. But then, Lemma 4 follows, since for any x00 2 (0;M=n) we have
that [x00; y0]  [x; y], x00 + y0 > M , and x0I0y0 for all x0 2 [x00; y0].
Subcase 1.2: n  3 and z0 satises the following inequalities: z0 < M < 2z0:
Using arguments similar to the ones used in Subcase 1.1 it is possible to show
that

 
R0; R0; R
0; :::; R0

= (M=2;M=2; 0; :::; 0) : (3.24)
Since x0 + y0  M and y0 > z0 > M2 we have that 0 < y0   M2  M2   x0, which
implies that we can nd an " > 0 such that M
2
+ " > y0 and M2   " > x0. As
before, we can assume that M
2
+ "  M because if y0 = M the statement follows
trivially as in Subcase 1.1. By Lemma 1,
 
M
2
  " I0M=2 and  M2 + "P0M=2
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hold since [x0; y0] is a maximal interval of indi¤erence for R0. Therefore, the
existence of " > 0 such that
 
M
2
  "; M
2
+ "; 0; :::; 0
 2 Z and (3:24) imply that
 (R0; R0; R
0; :::; R0) =2 E (R0; R0; R0; :::; R0), contradicting the e¢ ciency of .
Subcase 1.3: n = 2: Remember that we can suppose that M=n < y0 < M . By
strong symmetry,
 (R0; R0) = (M=2;M=2) : (3.25)
We can also nd " > 0 such that y0 < z0 + ", x0 < z0   ", (z0 + ")P0M=2, and
(z0   ") I0M=2. Therefore, the existence of " > 0 such that (z0   "; z0 + ") 2 Z
and (3.25) imply that  (R0; R0) =2 E (R0; R0), contradicting the e¢ ciency of .
Case 2: Its proof is omitted since it follows an argument which is symmetric
to the one used to prove Case 1. 
Proof of Theorem 1: Let R0 2 Rm be arbitrary. We have to show that R0 is
feebly single-plateaued. Consider the following cases:
Case A: Assume that M=n  p (R0). Then, (R0) = [M=n; p (R0)] : To show
that property (a) of Denition 8 holds, suppose rst that M=n  x < y  p (R0).
Then, by Lemma 1 (Case 1), yR0x. If yI0x then, by Lemma 4 (Case 1), there
exists an interval [x0; y0]  [x; y] such that x0 + y0 > M and x0I0y0 for all x0 2
[x0; y0]. Assume now that x < M=n  y  p (R0). Then, by Lemma 2 (Case
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1), M=nR0x. Moreover, by Lemma 1 (Case 1), yR0M=n. Therefore, since R0
is transitive, yR0x. If yI0x then, by Lemma 4 (Case 1), there exists an interval
[x0; y0]  [x; y] such that x0 + y0 > M and x0I0y0 for all x0 2 [x0; y0]. To show
that property (c) of Denition 8 holds, suppose that x 2  p (R0) ; p (R0). Then,
M=n  p (R0) < x < p (R0) which implies, by Lemma 1 (Case 1), that xR0p (R0),
and hence xI0 P (R0).
Case B: Assume that p (R0) M=n  p (R0). Then, (R0) =

p (R0) ; p (R0)

:
To show that property (c) of Denition 8 holds, assume rst that p (R0) = M=n
and let x be any share such that p (R0) < x  p (R0). By Lemma 1 (Case 1)
xR0p (R0) which implies that xI0p (R0). Assume now that p (R0) < M=n  p (R0).
By Lemma 2 (Case 1),
M
n
R0p (R0) . (3.26)
First, let x be any share such that p (R0) < x < M=n  p (R0). By Lemma 1
(Case 2) xR0M=n and by (3.26), xI0p (R0). Second, let x be any share such that
p (R0) < M=n < x  p (R0). By Lemma 1 (Case 1) xR0M=n and by (3.26),
xI0p (R0).
Case C: Assume that p (R0)  M=n. Then, (R0) =

p (R0) ;M=n

. The
proof that properties (b) and (c) of Denition 8 hold is symmetrical to that of
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Case A, using Cases 2s of Lemmata 1, 2, and 4, respectively.
The proof of Theorem 1 is completed by exhibiting a rule on the set of feebly
single-plateaued preferences , (Rfsp)n ; that satises the properties of strategy-
proofness, e¢ ciency, and strong symmetry. We obtain such a rule by extending
the uniform allocation rule  on the domain of single-plateaued preferences, Rsp,
to this larger domain.
The extended uniform rule on (Rfsp)n, 	, is dened by the following algorithm:
letR = (R1; :::; Rn) 2 (Rfsp)n be any prole of feebly single-plateaued preferences.
Stage 0: Let R =
 
R1; :::; Rn
 2 Rnsp be any prole of single-plateaued prefer-
ences such that

p (Ri) ; p (Ri)

=

p
 
Ri

; p
 
Ri

for all i 2 N . Compute   R
and let S0 be the set of agents receiving an amount in the interior of a maximal
interval of indi¤erence for Ri (the original preference), denoted by [x0i ; y
0
i ], such
that [x0i ; y
0
i ] 6=

p (Ri) ; p (Ri)

; that is,
S0 =
8>><>>:i 2 N j
 i
 
R
 2 (x0i ; y0i ) where [x0i ; y0i ] is a maximal interval
of indi¤erence for Ri and p (Ri)Pix for all x 2 [x0i ; y0i ]
9>>=>>; .
29
If S0 = ; then dene 	(R) =   R and stop. If S0 6= ; then select any prole
R1 = (R11; :::; R
1
n) 2 (Rfsp)n such that R1i = Ri for all i =2 S0 and for all i 2 S0
R1i =
8>><>>:
Ri on [0; y0i ] and y
0
i P
1
i x for all x > y
0
i if M 
P
p (Rj)
Ri on [x0i ;M ] and x
0
iP
1
i x for all x < x
0
i if
P
p (Rj) M
.7
Go to stage 1.
Now, for k 1, and given that the algorithm has not stopped yet at stage k-1,
stage k is as follows.
Stage k: Given the preference prole Rk =
 
Rk1 ; :::; R
k
n
 2 (Rfsp)n, the out-
come of stage k-1, let Rk =
 
Rk1 ; :::;
Rkn
 2 Rnsp be any prole of single-plateaued
preferences such that

p
 
Rki

; p
 
Rki

=

p
 
Rki

; p
 
Rki

for all i 2 N . Compute
 
 
Rk

. If  
 
Rk

=  
 
Rk 1

, dene 	(R) =  
 
Rk

and stop. Otherwise, let
Sk be the set of agents receiving an amount in the interior of a maximal interval
of indi¤erence for Rki , denoted by

xki ; y
k
i

, such that

xki ; y
k
i
 6= p  Rki  ; p  Rki ;
that is,
Sk =
8>><>>:i 2 N j
 i
 
Rk
 2  xki ; yki  where xki ; yki  is a maximal interval
of indi¤erence for Rki and p
 
Rki

P ki x for all x 2

xki ; y
k
i

9>>=>>; .
30
If Sk = ; then dene 	(R) =   Rk and stop. If Sk 6= ; then select any prole
Rk+1 =
 
Rk+11 ; :::; R
k+1
n
 2 (Rfsp)n such that Rk+1i = Rki for all i =2 Sk and for all
i 2 Sk
Rk+1i =
8>><>>:
Rki on

0; yki

and yki P
k+1
i x for all x > y
k
i if M 
P
p
 
Rkj

Rki on

xki ;M

and xkiP
k+1
i x for all x < x
k
i if
P
p
 
Rkj
 M .
Go to stage k+1.
The algorithm stops after at most n stages. This is because the sets Sk only
contain players whose stage k proposed shares are not maximal. Hence, for all
K  2
SK \
 
K 1[
k=0
Sk
!
= ;.
Note that the rule 	 satises strategy-proofness and strong symmetry. To
show that it satises e¢ ciency, let R = (R1; :::; Rn) 2 (Rfsp)n be arbitrary and
consider the following cases:
Case 1:
P
p(Rj) M 
P
p(Rj). Then, e¢ ciency is clearly satised because
 i
 
R0
 2 p(Ri); p (Ri) for all i 2 N implies that S0 = ; and the process stops
at stage 0 after setting 	(R) =  
 
R0

. Therefore, p(Ri)Ii	i (R) for all i 2 N ,
which means that 	(R) 2 E (R).
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Case 2: M  P p(Rj). Then, it is easy to show that 	i (R)  p(Ri) for all
i 2 N . Let S be the subset of agents who are rationed; that is,
S =

i 2 N j 	i (R) < p(Ri)
	
.
If S = ;, then P p(Rj) = M and 	i (R) = p(Ri) for all i 2 N , in which case,
	(R) 2 E (R). Therefore, suppose S 6= ; and assume that 	(R) =2 E (R); that
is, there exist a feasible allocation r = (r1; :::; rn) 2 Z and j 2 N such that:
riRi	i (R) for all i 2 N and
rjPj	j (R) . (3.27)
However, (3.27) and the denition of 	 imply that j 2 S and 	j (R) < rj. Denote
by [xj; yj] the maximal interval of indi¤erence containing 	j (R). By denition of
	, for all i 2 S;
	i (R) = 	j (R) .
Consider the preference prole R 2 (Rfsp)n where Ri = Ri if i =2 S and Ri = Rj
if i 2 S. By denition of 	;
	
 
R

= 	(R) .
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For all i =2 S, 	i (R) = p(Ri) hold, hence ri  	i
 
R

; implying that
P
i=2S ri P
i=2S 	i
 
R

: Since 	j
 
R

< rj; there exists k 2 N such that 	k
 
R

> rk,
because 	
 
R
 2 Z. Then
	k
 
R

Ikrk:
Because 	k
 
R
 2 [xj; yj] ; rk 2 [xj; yj] : Therefore,
M 
X
i2S
i6=j
ri + rj +
X
i=2S
	i
 
R

>
X
i2S
i6=j
ri + yjxj + yj;
a contradiction with the fact that R satises Denition 8.
Case 3: Assume that
P
p (Rj)  M . Then, an argument symmetric to the
one used in Case (2) proves that 	(R) 2 E (R). 
4. Concluding Remarks
We close with two remarks. First, we show how to derive a slightly weaker version
of Ching and Serizawa (1998) result as an implication of our Theorem. While we
have considered M as exogenous data, they formulate the division problem for
all possible values of M by letting rules depend not only on preferences proles
but also on all possible amounts of the good to be allocated. This distinction has
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important consequences for the maximality problem since their approach implies
that preferences have to be dened over all positive shares, and consequently the
same domain of preferences has to be maximal for all values ofM , while we search
for a maximal domain of preferences (on [0;M ]) for each value M . To formulate
the division problem in their setting, assume now that every agent i 2 N has a
continuous preference ordering over the interval IR+ and denote by R (1) the set
of all these preference orderings.
A rule on Vn  R (1)n and IR++ is a function 1 : Vn  IR++  ! IRn+ such
that
P
1i (R;M) =M for all (R;M) 2 Vn  IR++:
Consider the natural extensions of strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency, symmetry,
and strong symmetry to this new setting, where rules are dened on Vn and
IR++.8 Denote them by sp (1), eff (1), sy (1), and ssy (1).
The denition below adapts our concept of maximal domain of preferences to
their setting.
Denition 11. A set Rm(1) of preferences is a maximal (innite) domain for
a list of properties if: (1) Rm(1)  R (1); (2) there exists a rule on Rm(1)n
and IR++ satisfying the properties; and (3) there is no rule on Q(1)n and IR++
satisfying the same properties and such that Rm(1) ( Q(1)  R (1) :
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Ching and Serizawa (1998) prove that the set of single-plateaued preferences
is the unique maximal (innite) domain including single-peaked preferences for
sp (1), eff (1), and sy (1). Theorem 2 below identies the single-plateaued
domain using the strong version of symmetry.9
Theorem 2. The set of single-plateaued preferences,Rsp (1), is the unique max-
imal (innite) domain including single-peaked preferences for sp (1), eff (1),
and ssy (1).
Proof. Let Ra (1) be a domain on which there is a rule 1 on Ra (1)n and
IR++ satisfying sp (1), eff (1), and ssy (1). Assume also that Rs (1) 
Ra (1) : Given M , denote by Rfsp(M) the set of feebly single-plateaued pref-
erences and by Z (M) the set of allocations. Then, for each M 2 IR++, the rule
M : Ra (M)n  ! Z (M) satises strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency, and strong sym-
metry (where Ra (M) is the set of preferences on [0;M ] obtained by restricting
to [0;M ] all preferences in Ra (1)) after setting M (R) = 1 (R;M). Then,
by Theorem 1, Ra (M) = Rfsp(M) for every M 2 IR++. Since this is true for
every M it follows that Ra (1) =
T
M>0
Rfsp(M). Finally, one sees immediately
that Rsp (1) =
T
M>0
Rfsp(M). Hence Ra (1) = Rsp (1).
Second, the interval (Ri) is intimately related with option sets, where
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given a rule  on Vn and a preference Ri 2 V we dene the set of options left
open to the other agents by i declaring Ri at  as
 (Ri) =

x 2 [0;M ] j 9R i 2 Vn 1 such that i (Ri; R i) = x
	
.
This is not surprising, since option sets also play a fundamental role to describe
maximal domains in voting environments. The main two ideas are the following.
Given a preference Ri, alternatives at the left (right) of the top plateau and outside
the option set have to be worse than the smallest (largest) alternative in the option
set. Moreover, the preference Ri has to be single-plateaued on the option set.
It is easy to show here that, given a preference Ri 2 Rfsp and a strategy-proof,
e¢ cient and strongly symmetric rule on (Rfsp)n, the relationship between (Ri)
and  (Ri) is as follows. Suppose that Ri is such that M=n does not belong to
an indi¤erence interval, then (Ri) =  (Ri). However, if M=n belongs to an
indi¤erence interval, then  (Ri) =  (Ri)[ [x0; y0], where [x0; y0] is the maximal
interval of indi¤erence for Ri that contains M=n.
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6. Footnotes
1 See Sprumont (1995) and Barberà (1996) for two comprehensive surveys of this
literature as well as for two exhaustive bibliographies
2 Ching (1994) names this property equal treatment of equals. Ching and Serizawa
(1998) use the name of symmetry when the condition i (R) = j (R) is replaced
by i (R) Iij (R).
3 See Ching (1992), Schummer and Thomson (1997), Sprumont (1991), Thomson
(1994), (1995), and (1997) for alternative characterizations of the uniform alloca-
tion rule. In a recent paper, Weymark (1999) shows that Sprumonts characteri-
zation using e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, and anonymity still holds if continuity
of the preferences is not required.
4 See Moulin (1984) and Berga (1998) for characterizations of strategy-proof rules
under this domain restriction in a public good context.
5 See Example 1 at the end of Section 2 for an illustration of why e¢ ciency imposes
these conditions on the intervals of indi¤erence.
6 We often abuse language by using utility representation terminology to refer to
properties of preference relations.
7 Notice that the e¢ ciency of  implies that ifM P p (Rj) then  i (R)  p (Ri)
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and therefore y0i < p (Ri). Symmetrically, if
P
p (Rj)  M then p (Ri)   i (R)
and therefore x0i > p (Ri). The same argument will apply also in all stages.
8 This means that we have to replace, in Denitions 1, 2, and 3, the expression
for all R 2 Vnby the expression for all (R;M) 2 Vn  IR++.
9 It is an open question whether the maximal domain identied in Theorem 1
becomes larger if we substitute strong symmetry by symmetry.
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